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Photographed Metaphors: 
Meaning, Reference, and Translation in Manoel de Barros1 
 
Axel Pérez Trujillo Diniz 
University of Alberta, Edmonton 
 
In a brief letter written in May of 2011, Brazilian poet Manoel de Barros (1916-2014) conveyed 
his interest in collaborating with photographer Adriana Lafer on a book that would “express my 
verbal sketches; —with your images” (Arquitetura 48). Barros’s careful choice of words is 
compelling, for he prefers to write “express” instead of “transform” or “translate” in his 
correspondence with Lafer. The shift in the medium of expression, from words to images, 
suggests an engagement between writer and photographer that places language at the heart of 
their collaborative book titled Arquitetura do silêncio (2015). To “express” is to convey almost 
without mediation, as a transparent lens that allows light to penetrate, only then to slightly refract 
the image. It is a playful tension between transparency and refraction, just as in the cover of their 
book—a photograph of what looks like a window, in which the condensation of water is in 
focus, displaying how light refracts into infinitesimal drops of green. In this article, I will argue 
that Barros’ initial choice of words in describing his desire to work closely with Lafer reveals his 
ludic challenge of meaning and reference in language. In Arquitetura, Barros and Lafer display 
through words and photographs a mode of gazing that transfigures the world, focusing on the 
abandoned sites that surround us: “O olho vê, a lembrança revê, e a imaginação transvê. É 
preciso transver o mundo” (“The eye sees, memory re-sees, and imagination trans-sees. It is 
necessary to trans-see the world”) (Arquitetura 4). 
 
 Published shortly after Barros passed away in 2014, Arquitetura has received scarce 
attention from scholars. The book, however, offers an invaluable opportunity to explore the 
philosophic and literary dimensions of Barros’ “verbal sketches” through the unique 
juxtaposition of poems and photography. The composition of the book obliges the reader to 
linger and reflect on the relation between language and the world. It does so by shifting into and 
out of focus through its rhetoric of naming. Barros often names things—sometimes flora and 
fauna, and other times things (“coisas”) such as aluminum cans—which create textual silences 
whenever the reader is unable to imagine what the poet is referring to. While discussing Brazilian 
cultural identity and performance, Kathryn Bishop-Sanchez explains that the “silences of 
performativity” or “that which is not viewed, not represented, not addressed, and that which 
remains unseen” are often present in the artistic productions of Brazil (31). Arquitetura expresses 
those “silences of performativity” so as to refocus the way in which the reader perceives the 
                                                 
1 This article is the result of research completed at the Instituto Histórico e Geográfico do Mato Grosso do Sul 
(Brazil) with the financial support of the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research of the University of Alberta. All 
translations are the author’s and were revised by Gabriela Loires Diniz. 
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environment, challenging our notions of meaning and reference. Unable to see or imagine those 
seemingly out-of-focus poems and images, the reader’s gaze is displaced by such poetic silences. 
More than any other collection of poems by Barros, Arquitetura contemplates the possibility of 
engaging with the world around us in a manner that is never just a translation, but rather a 
performance that transfigures the reader’s gaze. 
 
 I am particularly interested in the latent philosophy of language that emerges in the 
collaboration between Barros and Lafer. This dimension has not gone unnoticed by scholars, 
although it has yet to be explored at length. Malcolm McNee, for example, describes Barros’ 
poetry as “philosophically spacious and abstract” (37). This “spacious and abstract” element 
situates Barros beyond the limits of regionalist writing. Although set in the Pantanal wetlands, his 
poetry is philosophically engaged, especially in regard to language. Nery Nice Biancalana Reiner 
suggests that there is a meta-poetic component that informs Barros’ poetry (56). Challenging the 
bounds of poetic language, Barros develops a writing style that is aware of itself as it expresses 
the world. Scholar Osmar Pereira Oliva also focuses on the philosophical traces in Barros, 
identifying the poet’s proximity with Wittgenstein in terms of their corresponding notions of the 
world and language (78). I will argue in a similar vein that Barros and Lafer’s book poetically 
questions the limits of language, more so than any other book by the Brazilian writer. I will 
present a nuanced discussion of his engagement with philosophy of language insofar as his 
poetry questions the relation between language and the world. My analysis will explore this 
aspect by reading Arquitetura alongside two notable philosophers of language in the analytic 
tradition: Gottlob Frege and Willard Van Orman Quine. Although present throughout the 
history of philosophy, the discussion of meaning and reference is particularly central to the 
analytic tradition. Both Frege and Quine offer insights that help bring to the forefront the 
significance of language in Barros’ poetry. Other notable philosophers have approached language 
in similar vein, such as Jacques Lacan and Jacques Derrida. I have opted to centre discussion on 
the analytic tradition of philosophy in the twentieth century, because the question of meaning 
and reference is specifically targeted by philosophers in that tradition. As McNee argues, Barros’ 
poetry is primarily “about language” (39). The questions raised by Frege and Quine on meaning, 
reference, and translation serve to fully appreciate the philosophical insights into language 
revealed in Arquitetura. 
 
 Central to Barros and Lafer’s book is the notion of “verbal sketches,” for it encompasses 
the ludic relation between words and images that motivates much of Barros’ writing. His poetic 
diction never ceases to surprise: “Eu queria que as garças me sonhassem. Eu queria que as 
palavras me gorjeassem. Então comecei a fazer desenhos verbais de imagens” (“I wanted herons 
to dream me. I wanted words to chirp me. Thus I began to make verbal sketches of images”) 
(Poesia completa 7). When reading this passage, one might be struck by its awkward construction. 
Could herons dream of the poet? Could words chirp him just like birds? The reader becomes 
aware that something seems amiss, for words by themselves make no sounds and birds may 
perhaps not dream at all. And yet Barros insists that his poetry does just that: it makes words 
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transubstantiate into the things they name. In Arquitetura he writes that “Queria ser a voz em que 
uma pedra fale” (“I wanted to be the voice in which a stone would speak” (23). Here a stone is 
invited to speak through his poetic voice. Words come not from the poet, but the stone. It is the 
latter that leverages his voice to speak. A reversal occurs. An object gains a voice through words. 
Readers often take for granted the distance that separates language from the world. They know 
that the moment one pronounces the word “heron,” no actual bird materializes in his or her 
mouth. It is assumed that stones have no say in the world, for they cannot express anything. 
Stones are stones, and herons are herons. Words represent things, and things can only await to 
be named—or so readers have been led to believe, claims Barros playfully. 
 
 To fully understand the ludic challenge to meaning and reference in his poetry, I will first 
explore the traditional distinction between sense and reference in Frege’s nominal work “On 
Sinn and Bedeutung,” all the while pointing to the ways in which Barros’ poetic diction questions 
such dichotomy in language. I will argue that Barros is engaged in a philosophical discussion of 
language in his poetry, one that contests some of the basic notions proposed by Frege and 
widely discussed by analytic philosophers. McNee points in that direction when suggesting that 
Barros’ poetry “paradoxically seeks both to return the word to an original state of nature and, 
simultaneously, to free the natural world from the restrictive confines of language” (39). This 
tension is manifested in the questioning of meaning and reference through Barros’ reimagining 
of the ways in which language interacts with the world. After concentrating on Frege, I will then 
briefly turn to Willard Van Orman Quine’s inquiries into the indeterminacy of translation in 
Word and Object (1960), before focusing solely on Arquitetura as it challenges meaning and 
reference through the juxtaposition of words and images. The indeterminacy of translation as 
explored by Quine offers a valuable bridge to understanding both the indeterminacy of meaning 
and vagueness of reference that Barros fully exploits in his collaboration with Lafer. It is this 
precise aspect of Arquitetura that is most salient—the blurring of boundaries between words and 
images—and is particularly striking in one of the final passages of the book, when Barros 
explains that while observing a cicada in the sun he “photographed this metaphor” (“Fotografei 
essa metáfora”) (5). Photographing metaphors encapsulates how his poetry plays with words and 
images so as to develop a meta-discourse on the nature of language. 
 
 Winner of the prestigious Jabuti literary award in 1990 for O guardador de águas and in 
2002 for O fazedor de amanhecer, Barros is one of the most cherished poets in Brazil, having been 
praised in a personal letter by Brazilian literary academic and translator Antônio Houaiss as a 
“singular creator of languages” (qtd. in 2016, 96). Barros stands out in Brazil as a poet who does 
not quite fit into the scheme of modernismo and its legacy. In modernismo, the lyric genre gained 
prestige and endeavoured to make “new forms” (Perrone 2). Poets were attracted to 
cosmopolitan centres such as São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. Barros, however, chose to return to 
a rural context in which he anchored his work. His poetry is all the more fascinating given his 
sensibility for the Pantanal region found in the Southwest of Brazil. Considered by geographers 
as a sedimentary plain, the Pantanal shares traits with the Amazonian and Savannah biomes 
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(Ab’Saber 12). It is, however, an independent ecosystem that is influenced topographically by the 
presence of the Paraguay River, which affects the cycles of flooding and drought (Franco et al 
21-24). Having been raised in the Pantanal as a child and later having returned as landowner in 
his family’s estate, Barros is particularly fond of the region. McNee claims that Barros’ “poetry is 
almost exclusively situated in Pantanal riverways, backwater towns, and childhood backyards” 
(38). He was also acquainted with other art forms, having taken art and film courses at the 
Museum of Modern Art (MOMA) in New York, prior to returning to the Pantanal in the 1960s 
(McNee 39). Published posthumously, Arquitetura is unique in its conception, for it presents the 
collaboration of Barros with Lafer in two mediums of expression that weave together in the 
book. In many ways, it is one of Barros’ most intimate projects. It is the book where Barros 
most playfully challenges language, writing in a manner that blurs the lines between poems and 
photographs, between words and images. And he does so by raising questions as to the nature of 
meaning and reference in language, whether it be by attempting for words to quite literally stick 
to the things they name or through syntactical constructions that entangle meaning and grow 
into a meta-discourse on language. As Barros paradoxically explains, “Eu só não queria significar. 
Porque significar limita a imaginação” (“I did not want to signify. Because to signify limits the 
imagination”) (2015, 31). The fact that he claims he did not simply “want to signify” anything, 
already points to the profound awareness of language in his poetry. Such a meta-awareness of 
language engages with philosophical questions regarding meaning and reference. 
 
 Naming through words has been for centuries a contested site for philosophers. The 
Sophists considered language a very powerful tool, one that could transform truth through 
rhetoric. Gorgias’ Encomium of Helen is a staunch defence of the force of rhetoric, of how words 
can change the world around us (Thomas 21). In Le problème de l’être chez Aristote (1983), Pierre 
Aubenque argues that it is this aspect of the Sophist movement that struck Aristotle deeply and 
motivated his relentless analysis of the categories of Being, attempting to pin down the 
multiplicities of language. Medieval philosophers continued debating the link between language, 
truth, and the world in what became the problem of universals (Tweedale 215). A central issue 
was whether words that were universal—that named a collection of individual instances—existed 
or not (Galluzzo and Loux 1). Take, for example, the word “tree,” which names all the different 
examples of trees, such as cherry trees or orange trees. Those individual instantiations of single 
trees are said to exist in the world. One can simply point to one and nod. But what about 
abstract words? Does the universal “tree” exist? Nominalism emerged as a school of thought 
with two salient strands, “one that maintains that there are no universals and one that maintains 
that there are no abstract objects” (Rodriguez-Pereyra). It questioned the limits of signification in 
the form of universals. For example, Peter Abelard carefully examined signification, criticizing 
the notion that universals are “ideas of” something or other (Tweedale 216). Although it satisfied 
some philosophers, many remained skeptical of the nominalist solution. It was not until the 
beginning of the twentieth century that the problem of naming and language emerged yet again 
in full force, this time championed by analytic philosophers looking to carefully scrutinize the 
logical layers of human language. This concern with the structure of language coincided with the 
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discovery of non-Euclidean geometries (i.e. Riemann and Bolyai) at the turn of the century, an 
issue that worried mathematicians and logicians alike, for Euclidean geometry had long been 
considered a standard-bearer for truth in the pure sciences (Wilson 380). 
 
 The German logician and mathematician Gottlob Frege (1848-1925) completed his 
doctoral dissertation on pure geometry, and so the rise of non-Euclidean geometries was in no 
way collateral to his work (Beaney 3). Throughout much of his career, he focused on providing 
“arithmetic with foundations” in what would later be termed as the “logicist project” (Beaney 3). 
Some of his most important achievements involved the development of propositional logic, yet 
it was a small article written in 1892 under the title “On Sinn and Bedeutung” that captured the 
attention of philosophers in regard to the consequences tied to our understanding of 
referentiality and meaning in language. In a 1970 series of lectures, Saul Kripke points to both 
Frege and Bertrand Russell as significant contributors to the logical analysis of names in natural 
languages, whilst also challenging their views (27). Quine also references Frege’s article at the 
beginning of his famous essay “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” insisting on the fundamental 
difference between “meaning and naming” (21). As scholar Beaney suggests, the “distinction 
between Sinn and Bedeutung, is probably the single most widely known and influential work in 
modern philosophy of language” (6). 
 
 Even Barros seems to playfully allude to this philosophical tradition when he writes “As 
coisas todas inominadas […] As palavras eram livres de gramáticas e podiam ficar em qualquer 
posição” (“All things unnamed […] Words were free of grammars and could linger in any 
position”) (2013, 395). Whereas the “logicist project” was committed to establishing the logical 
foundations of language—its grammar—, Barros attempts to reach out to things before they are 
given names. His poetry does not “mean” anything, at least in the traditional sense (2015, 32). At 
stake is how to express the creatures and things he sees strewn across the ground in his native 
Pantanal, so that “minhas palavras fizessem parte do chão como os lagartos fazem” (“my words 
would become a part of the ground as lizards do”) (2013, 429). He wants his words to quite 
literally stick to the things they name. His poetry thus challenges philosophical notions of 
language by taking referentiality as far as it will go—right to things themselves. To understand 
Barros’ tongue-in-cheek play with language, it is necessary to return to Frege’s initial distinction 
in the title of the mentioned article. 
 
 The essay “On Sinn and Bedeutung” concentrates on separating an expression’s 
connotative and denotative aspects. Interestingly, the English translations of the term 
“Bedeutung” have caused much confusion among philosophers, given the different uses of the 
word that appear in Frege’s works. The literal translation of the term is “meaning,” whereas the 
word “Sinn” means “sense.” According to Beaney, “Frege’s own use of ‘Bedeutung’ sounds as 
odd in German as ‘meaning’ does when used in translating his work into English” (37). 
However, the philosophical community has tended to translate “Bedeutung” into the term 
“reference,” so as to capture the denotative element of the term in its usage in the essay “On 
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Sinn and Bedeutung” (Beaney 36). Ironically then, Frege raises more questions regarding the 
distinction between “sense” and “reference” when translators are obliged to present his work in 
another language. One can almost imagine Barros offering a candid smile, reminding us that 
language cannot be imprisoned in grammar so easily. Nevertheless, Frege is committed to 
clarifying the two dimensions of words, one semantic and the other referential (Martinich 210). 
 
 The most cited example of this distinction is presented at the beginning of Frege’s essay, 
focusing on a simple unit of language, proper names: 
 
 It is natural, now, to think of there being connected with a sign (name, combination of 
 words, written marks), besides that which a sign designates, which may be called the 
 Bedeutung of the sign, also what I should like to call the sense of the sign, wherein the 
 mode of presentation is contained […] The Bedeutung of “Evening Star” would be the 
 same as that of “Morning Star”, but not the sense. (152) 
 
Here Frege poses the following problem. Two proper names seem to designate the same thing; 
that is, Venus. Yet although they refer to the same thing in the world, one would not say they 
mean the same thing, or else there would not be those two names. In the first case, “Evening 
Star” means a certain celestial body that appears during the evening, whereas the second case 
“Morning Star” means a certain celestial body that appears during the morning. As Martinich 
explains, the identity between the two names “is nontrivial and informative because, even though 
the Bedeutung of each term is the same, the Sinn of ‘the morning star’ is different from the Sinn of 
‘the evening star’” (211). Each proper name has a different “sense” but the same “Bedeutung.” 
Frege claims that in natural languages “It may be granted that a grammatically well-formed 
expression figuring as a proper name always has a sense. But this is not to say that to the sense 
there also corresponds a Bedeutung” (153). Hence words always have a meaning, but not always a 
reference. Poets are well aware of this characteristic of language. Barros prompts such an aspect 
when he writes about “O martelo de pregar água” (“The hammer of nailing water”) or “abulia 
vegetal sapal pedral” (“the vegetative frog-like stone-like abulia”) (2013, 448; 202). Both noun 
clauses have a figurative meaning that transforms the possibility of a reference into something 
absurd, yet Barros insists in his poetry being “verbal sketches” of the world around him in the 
Pantanal. The reader is left to consider the meaning and reference of what he or she reads. What 
could possibly be a “hammer of nailing water”? Is it a hammer that does not work because it 
cannot nail anything? Or is it an actual hammer that somehow accomplishes such a feat? Barros 
pulls and tugs at the limits of referentiality, wanting his words to stick to the things’ names, 
whilst also short-circuiting the possibility of his expressions having a reference. 
 
 Frege clarifies his position on proper names, suggesting that we expect such names to 
have a “Bedeutung” because “we are concerned with its truth-value” (157). That is, if a sentence 
has no reference it is generally considered false. He goes on to confess, however, that language 
speakers are not so invested in “Bedeutung” when considering artistic works: 
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 In hearing an epic poem, for instance, apart from the euphony of the language we are 
 interested only in the sense of the sentences and the images and feelings thereby aroused. 
 The question of truth would cause us to abandon aesthetic delight for an attitude of 
 scientific investigation. Hence it is a matter of no concern to us whether the name 
 “Odysseus”, for instance, has a Bedeutung, so long as we accept the poem as a work of art. 
 It is the striving for truth that drives us always to advance from the sense to the 
 Bedeutung. (157) 
 
The denotative aspect of language is not fundamental but rather cursory to fiction and poetry, 
for the “aesthetic delight” is the priority of the work, not its “truth.” Frege seems to push artistic 
works away from the referential sphere of language. One should not be interested in whether 
Barros’ “hammer of nailing water” or “vegetative frog-like stone-like abulia” has an actual 
“Bedeutung,” because the aesthetic emphasis of such phrases is on their sense. 
 
 This is all well and good, but what is the sense of the proper name “Odysseus”? It might 
be that the word has no reference, but that might depend on what one means when using that 
proper name. According to Kripke, Frege argues that such a proper name is “a definite 
description abbreviated or disguised” (1980, 27). This suggests that proper names are linked to 
longer descriptions that establish their meaning. For example, “Aristotle” is an abbreviation for 
“the man who taught Alexander the Great” (1980, 30). And once one has the sense of the 
proper name, he or she can consider whether or not it has a reference. Although the solution 
seems straightforward, Kripke is not so quick to accept it: “I think it’s pretty certain that the 
view of Frege and Russell is false” (1980, 29). It is the “problem of vacuous names and reference 
to what does not exist, of fictional entities” (2013, 3). The general issue with the description 
approach to proper names is that it is painstakingly difficult to establish a single definition, for 
“Odysseus” could contain a whole set of different descriptions, none of which anything other 
than contingent (1980, 30). 
 
 Barros also poses a challenge to the reference of a fictional entity. He does so through 
one of the recurrent characters in his poetry, that of Bernardo da Mata. Considering the 
influence of Portuguese writer Fernando Pessoa on Barros, it is only natural that many readers 
would consider Bernardo da Mata a fictional character—an alter-ego, just as Alberto Caeiro and 
other heteronyms of Pessoa (Silvério 118). That is, many would have considered Bernardo da 
Mata a proper name that lacked reference. Barros seems to point in that direction when he first 
presents his readers with Bernardo: “Esse é Bernardo. Bernardo da Mata. Apresento. Ele faz 
encurtamento de águas […] Como a foz de um rio—Bernardo se inventa…” (“That is Bernardo. 
Bernardo da Mata. I introduce him. He does the shortening of waters […] As the estuary of a 
river—so does Bernardo invent himself…”) (2013, 221). Readers are presented with a character 
that can do the “shortening of waters.” The structure of the sentence is every bit as awkward in 
Portuguese as in English, and this amplifies the fictional aspect of Bernardo. If one was to take 
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the short description “He does the shortening of waters” as the sense of the proper name 
“Bernardo da Mata,” then he or she would most likely consider the name to have no reference. 
Moreover, the last phrase reinforces the seemingly fictional presentation: “so does Bernardo 
invent himself.” The reader is offered an ambiguous sentence, for it is not certain in what way 
Bernardo invents himself. And then there is the ellipsis at the end, suggesting that the reader 
must linger on the vague phrase, savouring the possibility that Bernardo is purely a figment of 
Barros’ imagination. Yet in several interviews with the Brazilian poet, it seemed that Bernardo 
was a close friend, a real person that had inspired Barros. Journalist Bosco Martins recently 
wrote a short piece titled “Manoel de Barros renasce Bernardo” in which he inquires as to the 
friendship between the real Bernardo and Barros in Campo Grande, Brazil. He suggests that 
both Barros and his wife Stella had taken care of Bernardo in his old age. Readers are thus left 
feeling deceived, led to believe in the apparent fictionality of Bernardo, only to realize that he 
was a real person. Barros would most likely not resolve our questions of whether or not the 
proper name “Bernardo da Mata” has a referent, yet the ambiguity with which readers are left is 
a challenge to referentiality. It is as if he playfully explains that language is far more intricate—
filled with awkward twists and turns—than what philosophers of language might have one 
believe. 
 
 Returning to Frege, the analytic philosopher offers a brief yet interesting commentary on 
translation and its role in the distinction between “Sinn” and “Bedeutung” at the beginning of 
his essay that will help establish a continuity with Quine’s work on the indeterminacy of 
translation and Arquitetura. Whereas the logician Frege is invested in systematizing the 
infrastructure of language, the performative aspect of translation proves too difficult a challenge, 
even when considering proper and common names. In “On Sinn and Bedeutung,” he argues that 
translation only takes place at the level of “sense,” an aspect that explains the “possible 
differences” in the “colouring and shading which poetic eloquence seeks to give sense” (155). 
Translators thus concentrate on the “colouring and shading” that modifies the sense of words. 
He does not, however, consider the problem of referentiality in translating names. Superficially, 
translations might seem to focus only on the meaning of words, but as Quine makes clear in 
Word and Object, there is far more at stake than the “sense” of the words when performing a 
translation. 
 
 For the sake of argument, let us consider that traditionally a “correct” translation would 
entail that a sentence in one language is transformed into an equivalent sentence in another 
language. This popular view of translation hinges on the transitive equivalencies between 
languages. In other words, the sense or meaning of the sentence is sustained from one language 
to the next. This is what Frege’s cursory comment on translation seems to suggest, and it is 
precisely this comment that Quine contests in Word and Object (Miller 141). Quine challenges the 
semantic equivalencies between languages. According to Gilbert Harman, “Quine claims that 
meaning is never preserved—or rather that one can speak of preservation of meaning only 
relative to some general scheme of translation” (15). Much of Quine’s argument in favour of the 
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indeterminacy of translation is geared towards reformulating a theory of meaning, one that takes 
into consideration the role of stimuli in the acquisition of language. As scholar Dagfinn Føllesdal 
suggests in his preface to Word and Object, “From the very first pages of Word and Object Quine 
stressed that what we perceive, and what we take others to perceive, plays a crucial role in 
language learning and language use” (xviii). Behaviouristic and naturalistic in its conception of 
language, Quine’s approach focuses on the public nature of language by integrating the role of 
stimuli in his philosophical scheme. 
 
 To fully grasp the reformulation that he envisions, it is important to take a careful look at 
the definition of “stimulus meaning” that he offers: “The stimulus meaning of a sentence for a 
subject sums up his disposition to assent to or dissent from the sentence in response to present 
stimulation” (2013, 30). Meaning is the response provoked when presenting a speaker with a 
sentence in a specific context of stimuli, so as to ascertain that the stimulus is linked to the 
utterance. What a word or sentence means is determined by the observable response given when 
presented with that same sentence as an inquiry. This fits in with the “objective pull” through 
which individuals are trained by society to “inculcate” the proper use of language (2013, 5). 
Society trains individuals by addressing their usage of language in regard to observable responses. 
Take, for example, the word “red.” If a child points at a white object and says “red,” the most 
likely response of parents will be to correct their child. Similar to behaviour modifications, so is 
language acquisition based on observable responses. 
 
 In Quine’s famous example of “Gavagai,” a linguist approaches a native who speaks a 
language that has no relation with other known languages and utters “Gavagai” when a rabbit 
appears within the native’s visual field. The utterance “Gavagai” is a one-word sentence that the 
linguist deploys in an attempt to ascertain the native’s disposition, given that specific stimuli 
context. If the native assents on several occasions to the utterance and visual cues of a rabbit, 
then the linguist would be able establish a semantic equivalency—the translation—between 
“Gavagai” and “Rabbit.” If such a simple translation preserves meaning from one language to 
the next, no further problem would arise. Quine, however, pushes the matter further and 
explores the possible discrepancies in his philosophical experiment: 
 
Thus suppose that the stimulation on the heels of which the informant is asked 
“Gavagai?” is a composite stimulation presenting a bystander pointing to an ill-glimpsed 
object and saying “Gavagai”. This composite stimulation will probably turn out to 
belong  to the affirmative stimulus meaning of “Gavagai” for the informant, and not the 
stimulus meaning of “Rabbit” for most English speakers, on whom the force of the 
bystander’s verbal intervention would be lost. Such cases would not fool our linguist, but 
they do count against defining synonymy as sameness of stimulus meaning. (33) 
 
The successful translation of “Gavagai” for “Rabbit” presupposes the possibility of isolating the 
specific stimuli that establish “meaning,” otherwise “intrusive information” may distort the 
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synonymity between both terms. Synonymity is the equivalency between both “stimulus 
meanings.” Although the linguist may be more or less successful in peeling away “intrusive 
information,” there remains always an undecidable aspect in attempting a translation of 
“stimulus meaning.” Radical translation from one language into a completely foreign one—one 
in which there are no cognates—makes evident the gaps between languages and the world 
around us. However public responses are to verbal cues, meaning is not fully contained in the 
speaker’s dispositions. Meaning is indeterminate. In the words of Quine, “The principle of 
indeterminacy of translation requires notice just because translation proceeds little by little and 
sentences are thought of as conveying meanings severally” (2013, 71). That is, the 
“indeterminacy of translation” reveals the “semantic indeterminacy” of natural languages (2013, 
71). When faced with two different translations, Quine argues that one would be hard-pressed to 
decide whether one translation was “correct” over the other. 
 
 Even if the philosophical experiment that Quine poses is mainly directed at a theory of 
meaning, it raises questions regarding referentiality. Meaning and naming are not entirely 
disjointed in language, especially in the use of common and proper names. Given the possibility 
of “intrusive information,” how can the linguist ever be certain that “Gavagai” and “Rabbit” 
both refer to the same stimulus? When the native points to something quickly moving through 
the landscape and says “Gavagai,” the linguist may consider that the reference is to the rabbit, 
although just as likely the reference might be to the fact that a rabbit is running. The linguist is 
placed at a juncture where “Gavagai” might refer simply to “Rabbit” or to “Rabbit running.” 
Unable to make a decision as to which of the two is correct, he is left to ponder on the 
indeterminacy of naming. Quine suggests as much when he explores “the indeterminacies and 
irregularities of reference that pervade” (2013, 113). Language is vague in how it refers to the 
world. Thus speakers are confronted not only with an indeterminacy in meaning, but also with 
that of reference. “Gavagai” is a far more elusive word than what at first seemed. 
 
 Quine’s philosophical analysis of the semantic indeterminacy and referential vagueness of 
language offers an invaluable entry into Barros’ poetry. As I have argued, the Brazilian writer 
challenges the imprisoning of language into strict grammars. He rather prefers to “play” with 
words (2013, 390). Take, for example, the bird “bem-te-vi-cartola” that appears in Arquitetura 
(38). The name refers to what in English is known as the “great kiskadee.” A translator working 
on the proper name can quickly come up with the English equivalent. However, Barros chooses 
to add the word “cartola” at the end, which literally means “hat.” The construction of names for 
flora and fauna in Portuguese is based on linking words with hyphens, and so the common name 
of many animals has both a reference and meaning. In the case of the “bem-te-vi-cartola,” it 
literally means “I-saw-you-well-hat.” Besides the reference to a specific avifauna, there is also a 
play on the cheerful song of the bird as it greets passersby. The literalness of the name mimics 
the thing it names. And what is even more interesting, the actual name “bem-te-vi” is also an 
onomatopoeia derived from the indigenous Tupi language in its mimicking of the kiskadee’s 
song. By adding the “cartola” particle to the name, the literalness of the word is highlighted. The 
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“bem-te-vi” does indeed have plumage on its head that makes it look like it has a hat on. This 
play on verbally imitating that which is named is recurrent in Barros’ poetry, although it becomes 
lost in the literal English translation. 
 
 Blurring the limits of meaning and reference is at the heart of Arquitetura. The 
composition of the book suggests the interweaving of poems and photographs—it acts like a 
play of mirrors that refracts the “photographed metaphors” and transforms the reader’s gaze of 
the Pantanal. The book unfolds as a case, with a small volume of Lafer’s photographs on the left 
and a corresponding volume of Barros’ poetry on the right. This allows the reader to follow 
poems and photographs side by side. A closer look at the relationship between photographs and 
poems reveals how Lafer’s images are not simply images of things represented in the poems. 
That is, the images and poems are autonomous, and can be read separately without hindering 
comprehension. Readers can leaf through the photographs and later return to read the poems, or 
vice versa. However, there is an interweaving between images and poems that provides a much 
richer reading of the book. Neither the photographs nor the poems are privileged over each 
other. Yet there is a conscious effort to integrate images and words as a whole. For example, 
when the reader opens the book—so as to read the first poem and photograph—the image on 
the left continues on to the second page of the first poem, giving the impression of continuity 
between the two. The left inside cover of the book also contains the beginning of a quotation 
“Penso que a harmonia é a arquitetura do nosso silêncio…” (“I believe that harmony is the 
architecture of our silence…”) which finishes on the right inside cover “…que quase esconde o 
nosso júbilo e a nossa dor” (“…that almost hides our joyfulness and our pain”). 
 
 The key to understanding this integration of words and images can be found in the first 
poem: “Tem mais presença em mim o que me falta. / Meu avesso é mais visível do que um 
poste. / Sábio é o que adivinha.” (“It has more presence within me what I lack. / My reverse is 
more visible than a post. / Wise is he that guesses”) (2015, 3). The first phrase hinges on the 
dichotomy between presence and absence, reversing both terms. That which is absent is most 
visible. The second phrase continues in the same vein, incorporating the notion of “opposite 
side” or “reverse” in the established contrast. The reader, however, is left wondering which is 
which. Are the photographs the “reverse,” or is it the poems? The same could be said for the 
absence and presence binary. Are the photographs what is absent in the poems? Or are the 
poems what is absent in the photographs? The play between images and words seems to 
perform silences that lead the reader to reflecting on how language portrays the world. The 
composition of the book favours a meta-discourse that is inspired by the gaps of language. The 
circularity between words and images obliges the reader to reconsider whether a dichotomy is 
the best manner of reflecting the relationship between the two. There does not seem to be an 
equivalency between poems and photographs—they are not translatable in the traditional sense. 
Although one might be able to read the book with images on one side and poems on the other, 
they are not synonymous in their meaning.  
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An example of this is the poem “Punhal” (“Dagger”): 
 
 Eu vi uma cigarra atravessada pelo sol—como se 
 um punhal atravessasse o corpo. 
 Um menino foi, chegou perto da cigarra, e disse que 
 ela nem gemia. 
 Verifiquei com meus olhos que o punhal estava 
 atolado no corpo da cigarra 
 E que ela nem gemia! 
 Fotografei essa metáfora. 
 Ao fundo da foto aparece o punhal em brasa. (6) 
 (I saw a cicada penetrated by the sun—as if 
 a dagger had pierced its body. 
 A child went, arrived near the cicada, and said that 
 she did not even whimper. 
 I verified with my own eyes that the dagger was 
 stuck in the body of the cicada 
 And it did not even whimper! 
 I photographed that metaphor. 
 In the background of the photo appears the dagger in embers.) 
 
The poem presents a vivid image that Barros captures by photographing “that metaphor,” a 
cicada out in the sun. It presents a concerned poet who wants to make sure the cicada is alright 
after being stabbed by sunlight. This concern does not seem entirely sincere, yet it evokes the 
playful naïveté of children experiencing the outdoors. The imagery deployed is very visual, 
containing a “cicada penetrated by the sun” as if “a dagger had pierced the body.” Moreover, 
there is a strong narrative element to the poem, for Barros is describing an event in which there 
are two witnesses—himself and a child. The poem seems concrete, set in a quotidian scene in 
the Pantanal. The poet observes the innocent gaze of a child not yet aware that the sun cannot 
stab a cicada. There is, however, a dramatic pull away from the quotidian scene the moment the 
poet insists that he “photographed that metaphor.” What seems like a “verbal sketch” of a child 
observing a cicada out in the sun, is actually a metaphor that the poet chooses to photograph—
with words, no less. The scene referred to by the poem is actually a metaphor. The reader 
immediately loses his or her bearings as to the referentiality of the poem. If the cicada out in the 
sun is but a metaphor, then the sunlight as a dagger stabbing the cicada is a metaphor of a 
metaphor. Just like a play on mirrors, the reader no longer knows where the original reflection is 
to be found. The things named in the poem do not refer to a scene outside the poem, but 
become entangled in Barros’ poetic diction. 
 
 No matter how concrete the poem seems, Lafer’s photograph does not capture a cicada 
out in the sun, but rather an image that is mostly out of focus, except for a yellow leaf that 
 
TranscUlturAl, vol. 9.1 (2017), 105-122.  
http://ejournals.library.ualberta.ca/index.php/TC  
 
 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License 117 
 
 
appears to the left. The photograph displays yellow and brown blemishes of what appears to be a 
tree. As the reader looks closer, Lafer’s photograph appears to be a close-up of a leaf that lights 
up as the sun hits its surface. The leaf is like an ember, burning with light. Even if it is not 
synonymous with the poem, it builds on the image of sunlight as a “dagger in embers” that 
appears at the end of “Punhal.” It is the “reverse” of the poem, much the same way the poem is 
the “opposite side” of the photograph. Both “express” rather than “translate” a mode of seeing 
the world, through a gaze directed at the small things to be found in the Pantanal, such as a 
cicada out in the sun or a leaf lit up like an ember. 
 
 Arquitetura hinges on transforming the way readers see the world around them, whether 
it be through photographs or “verbal sketches.” To “express” Barros’ poetry is to capture the 
way he looks at his Pantanal. It is about displaying the “reverse” of the world, the marginal sites 
whose absence is most visible to the Brazilian poet. Lafer’s photography in the book includes 
many images that are out-of-focus, only bringing out a small detail that is marginal at first. The 
drops of condensation that appear on the cover are representative of this infinitesimal look at 
the world, innocent yet deeply philosophical in its challenge to language. In many of the 
photographs, children appear playing in the background, as a testament to the ludic nature of 
Barros’ gaze. An untitled poem in the book brilliantly captures how to “express” is to “un-see 
the world,” to playfully break the rules of meaning and reference in language so as to create a 
new mode of expression that is never simply a translation. To express is rather to search for new 
words and images that stick to the things they name and fly away metaphorically: 
 
 O abandono do lugar me abraçou com 
 força. 
 E atingiu meu olhar para toda a vida. 
 Tudo que conheci depois veio carregado 
 de abandono. 
 Não havia no lugar nenhum caminho de 
 fugir. 
 A gente se inventava de caminhos com 
 as novas palavras. 
 A gente era como um pedaço de 
 formiga no chão. 
 Por isso o nosso gosto era só de 
 desver o mundo. (31) 
  
 [The abandonment of the place embraced me with 
 force. 
 And reached my gaze for all my life. 
 Everything that I knew afterward came laden 
 with abandonment. 
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 There was no path in this place 
 to run away. 
 We would invent paths with 
 new words. 
 We were like a piece of 
 ant on the ground. 
 Because of that we simply enjoyed 
 un-seeing the world.] 
 
The poem has an autobiographical tone, as if Barros is describing his youth to express the 
origins of his “verbal sketches.” It is the “abandonment” of the place he saw that shaped his 
gaze upon the world. “Abandonment” is a recurrent theme in his writing. Barros often writes 
about marginal and “insignificant” things—such as ants, dirt, frogs, or even trash. It “reached” 
his “gaze” and transformed the way he saw everything. Notice how the first few passages are 
almost oppressive. The “abandonment” caught hold of the poet and “embraced him with force,” 
imbuing everything he would later see as “laden with abandonment.” Barros’ gaze carries the 
weight of those things that are abandoned. There is “no path in this place to run away,” except 
through the walkways that “new words” allow. At this point, the poem shifts from the dead 
weight of “abandonment” to the promise of new transformations through language. The “un-
seeing” of the Pantanal is linked to those “new words.” He is aware that the “un-seeing” of the 
world requires becoming aware of language in all its multiplicity and indeterminacy. Language 
imprisoned in grammar or linguistic categories cannot “express” the richness of his world. 
 
 Next to the untitled poem is a top-down photograph of a marsh in the Pantanal. Lilly 
pads are smeared with thick, muddy waters in a composition of light and shadows that gives a 
sombre sensation to the photograph. Some of the lily pads are rotten with a yellowish hue, while 
dense algae linger just beneath. On the surface, the scene appears to be abandoned, as a place 
that many would avoid in favour of more sublime vistas. The muddy waters hide underneath a 
fecund world, awaiting the chance to burst forth. The photograph expresses well the sense of 
embryonic aspect that “abandonment” generates in Barros’ poetry. In those abandoned sites that 
seem to have no escape, the poet finds a new language that imagines the world differently. 
Instead of offering a panoramic view of the landscape, Lafer follows Barros’ gaze into the 
marginal sites of the region, the muddy shores of the swamps. Her photograph expresses the 
poet’s “êxtase no cisco” (“ecstasy in dirt”) (22).  
 
 Both the poet and photographer exploit the blurred edges of language as it names the 
world, revealing new modes of seeing what lies around us. Their gaze challenges how language 
traditionally represents the world. If one considers language to simply reflect the world in the 
form of words or images, then it becomes a prison that condemns humans to ignoring those 
marginalized sites that offer resistance. Barros’ playful use of language—using words that imitate 
the things named, only to reveal that they are fictitious—obliges readers and translators alike to 
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reconsider what it means to “express” his poetry. Arquitetura showcases his meta-awareness of 
language, far more than any other of his books. The incorporation of photographs pushes the 
reach of his “verbal sketches,” weaves words with images, and images with words. What at first 
begins as an attempt to make words stick to the things they name, gradually transforms into a 
language game that shifts the reader’s gaze out of focus. And then he refocuses the lens, 
emphasizing what had at first been neglected: “Aprendo com abelhas do que com aeroplanos. É 
um olhar para baixo que eu nasci tendo. É um olhar para o ser menor, para o insignificante que 
eu me criei tendo” (“I learn more from bees than airplanes. It is a looking-down gaze that I was 
born with. It is a gaze into the minor being, into the insignificant that I was raised with”) (2015, 
34). Barros challenges meaning and reference in language in order to playfully lead his readers to 
see the world in a new light. His collaboration with photographer Lafer bears witness to this 
profound sensibility for language and the Pantanal.  
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